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Abstract: In EU countries and several states in the U.S., the wholesale power markets are well 
developed enough to be utilized by many electric power companies. These companies usually 
have a trading division which intensively handles all of transactions with fuel and power markets 
standing between generation and retail divisions, even if they were vertically integrated before 
liberalization. This study quantitatively evaluates the effects of potential use of market 
opportunities through the trading division, and compare them under different conditions and 
constraints. Then we clarify the problem that under which price conditions in the future the trading 
function will work effectively. 
 
Keyword: electric power market, trading mechanism, internal transaction, profit maximization, 
SBM-max model 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The System Reform in the electricity industry is now 
underway in Japan, for instance, the retail electricity 
markets for domestic customers will be opened in April, 
2016. Government expects that the Reform will promote 
new entries, result in revitalizing the competition in the 
electricity market. Along with this, it is also expected 
that the wholesale power market will be revitalized, even 
though the liquidity has been very limited since it was 
established in 2005. 
In EU countries and several states in the U.S., 
electricity retail markets were already opened and also 
the liquidity of wholesale power markets has been much 
higher than that in Japan. In their countries and states, it 
is common for power companies to utilize a wholesale 
market through “trading function”. Although some 
companies own trading function as a department, others 
have a subsidiary company for trading, the basic 
functions are same among them. In this study, we refer to 
the organization which has trading function in the 
company as a “trading division” or “TD” hereinafter.  
In Japan, electric power companies have been 
vertically integrated, and the generation division (GD) 
has sent the most of generated electricity to the retail 
division (RD) directly as a matter of course. However, it 
will be changed in accordance with the increase of the 
market liquidity in the wholesale power market. Actually, 
some power companies are attempting to establish TD in 
preparation for effective use of market opportunities. On 
the other hand, others are skeptical about utilization of 
market mechanisms and the effects of TD.  
This study attempts to quantitatively clarify the effect 
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of utilizing market opportunities through TD. Market 
prices are fluctuating from moment to moment and it is 
basically difficult to precisely predict them. However, we 
can simulate the effect of the price fluctuation and 
prepare for it. In this study, we examine under what price 
condition in the future the trading function will 
effectively work. 
This paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we 
summarize how the electricity internal transaction 
system in power companies in EU and U.S changed 
between before and after liberalization. Then, in Section 
3, the framework of quantitative analysis is explained in 
order to clarify the effect of trading function. The results 
are shown in Section 4 and some remarks follow in the 
last section. 
2. TRADING FUNCTION IN POWER COMPANY  
Before liberalization of the electric power industry in 
many countries including Japan, typical electric power 
companies were vertically integrated, which has several 
functions inside one company such as generation, 
transmission, distribution and retail functions. It was 
quite common for these companies to internally transmit 
generated electricity to the retail division (Figure 1a). 
However, after liberalization, as wholesale power 
markets were gradually developed in several countries in 
EU, the representative power companies established TD 
in order to sell and buy electricity at the market 
effectively on behalf of GD and RD (Figure 1b). This 
enables the whole (parent) company to concentrate 
various market risk management to the TD on the 
one-stop basis.  
Moreover, referring to market prices, TD procures 
fossil fuels for generation as well as instructs economic 
load dispatch to optimize operation of the whole 
generation assets through fuel and power trading based 
on profit maximization. This means that, GD produces 
electricity only when they can make profit. For instance, 
when fuel prices are high while a power price is 
relatively low, TD will decide to purchase electricity 
from the market to cover the final demand in RD instead 
of ordering GD to produce electricity at its own power 
plants.  
In this market-oriented system (referred to as “MO 
system” hereinafter), there is no direct transaction 
between GD and RD, which is completely different from 
the vertically integrated system before liberalization 
(referred to as “VI system” hereinafter). The difference is 
attributable to the volume and price constraints on the 
internal transaction as follows. 
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 1a: Before liberalization 1b: After liberalization 
Figure 1: Change of the internal transaction of electricity in the power companies 
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 Volume constraint: 
In the VI system, all of the electricity demand in RD is 
covered by electricity generated at power plants in GD. 
In other words, the volume of the internal transaction is 
strictly constrained, while it is completely free in the MO 
system, i.e. TD can freely choose sources of electricity 
from the power market and/or the internal transaction in 
order to cover the final demand in RD. 
 Price constraint:  
In the traditional VI system, the transfer price of the 
internal transaction is based on generation cost, while in 
the MO system, it is decided based on market prices. In 
the market mechanism, prices depend on supply and 
demand, not based on cost. Therefore, in this situation, 
the cost-based price setting in the VI system can be 
regarded as a strict constraint.  
 
This study compares these two systems and clarifies 
the effects of trading function from the three points of 
view as follows: 
A. Profit (return):  
If a power company effectively utilize the fuel and 
power markets in the MO system, total profit of the 
company will be maximized rather than depending on 
the internal transaction in the VI system. In other words, 
the strict volume and price constraints may inhibit the 
profit maximization of the company. 
B. Stability of the profit (risk) 
However, the company will be exposed by market 
risks in the MO system.  
C. Competitiveness 
If the company utilizes the market price for the 
internal transfer price, the profit will be optimized, but 
the competitiveness in the retail market may be reduced, 
because it cannot make differentiation of retail prices 
among competitors. In the VI system, the cost-based 
internal price may have advantage over the MO system, 
especially in the case the company own inexpensive 
power plants such as a hydro power plant. In this study, 
we employ the retail price level as a competitive index. 
We assume the lower price can enhance competitiveness 
of the company.  
 
In general, high-risk case could bring high return, and 
higher competitiveness (lower retail price level) could 
fall into lower profit. In other words, these three factors 
listed above would bring different evaluation even under 
the same condition. In such case, DEA will be a very 
powerful method to conduct comprehensive evaluation 
based on multi-factors. So, in this study, we apply the 
SBM-max model (Tone, 2015) to evaluate the VI and 
MO systems under several market price conditions.  
3. MEASURING THE EFFECT OF TRADING 
FUNCTION 
In this section, we explain how to measure the effect 
of trading function under different conditions.  
3.1. Definition of transaction volumes and prices 
Figure 2 summarizes the electricity transactions in a 
typical power company after liberalization, where 
notations in the parentheses indicate electricity volume 
and price.  
 Generation division (GD) 
We postulate GD owns gas and coal fired, and hydro 
power plants. eitG  is actually consumed fuel measured 
by kWh in period t (t = 1,…,T)1, where “i” indicates the 
type of power plants (i = gas, coal and hyd). Each power 
plant cannot generate electricity over the capacity ( eiG ).  
  
e
i
e
it GG ≤  (1) 
w
itp  is a fuel price, which is, in this study, defined as a 
market price fluctuating on a moment-to-moment basis 
                                                          
1
 The unit of time period “t” can be minute, hour, day, and so on.  
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for gas and coal, while a price for hydro power is 0. 
Total generated power and an average generation (fuel) 
cost are measured based on the actually consumed 
volume as  
  
e
t
i
e
it
w
it
w
t
i
e
it
e
t G
Gp
pGG
∑
∑ == , . (2) 
The decision to generate electricity or not in GD is 
made by TD at different times referring to fuel and 
power market prices. 
 Internal transaction (GD → TD) 
All of generated power ( etG ) is transmitted from GD 
to TD at the internal transfer price ( pg ), which is defined 
as an average of wtp  during T periods as  
  ∑=
t
w
tg
T
pp . (3) 
 Trading division (TD) 
TD sells generated electricity at plant i to the power 
market ( sitE ) at the market sell price ( stp ) and/or sent to 
RD ( ritG ) at the transfer price ( rtp ), whose definition 
will be appeared later in Eq. (6). 
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TD also has to procure electricity to cover all of the 
retail demand in RD ( y ). TD decides the purchasing 
volume from the market ( btE ) and the generated volume 
at the power plants ( rtG ) based on the fuel and power 
market prices.  
  
r
t
b
ti
r
it
b
t GEGEy +=+= ∑  (5) 
For instance, when the transfer price ( rtp ) is relatively 
higher than the market buy price ( btp ), TD will procure 
electricity from the market.  
  Internal transaction (TD → RD) 
All of electricity demand in RD ( y ) is procured by 
TD and transmitted to RD at the transfer price ( rtp ), 
which is defined as a weighted sum between the 
generation cost ( wtp ) and the market buy price ( btp ): 
  
b
t
w
t
r
t ppp )1( ββ −+= , (6) 
where, β is a parameter, which will be explained in the 
next subsection.  
 Retail division (RD) 
RD sells electricity received from TD to customers 
adding γ % retail margin, and therefore, the retail price 
( ytp ) is  
  
r
t
y
t pp )1( γ+= . (7) 
Obviously, a company can earn more profit if it sets 
large margin rate. However, actually in the competitive 
retail market, it is difficult to set a large γ to survive the 
competition. 
3.2. Constraints on vertical integration 
In order to compare the VI and MO systems, we 
assumes two parameters for volume and price constraints 
on vertical integration.  
 Volume constraint: α 
We postulate that TD has to use electricity from GD, 
which is generated at the own power plants, to cover at 
least α ∗ 100% of the retail demand as 
  )10( ≤≤≥∑ αα yGi rit . (8) 
α = 0 (MO system): TD can decide the volume to 
generate at the power plants, to sell to the market, 
and to buy from the market only based on the 
market mechanism without any constraints. 
α = 1 (VI system): TD has to cover all of the retail 
demand by electricity generated at its own plants 
in GD regardless of the market price level.  
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Figure 2: Transaction volumes and prices 
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 Price constraint: β 
As shown in Eq. (6), the internal transfer price ( rtp ) 
from TD to RD is defined based on the generation cost 
( wtp ) and market buy price ( btp ) weighted by β.  
β = 0 (MO system): The retail price ( ytp ) is defined 
based on only the market price.  
β = 1 (VI system): The retail price ( ytp ) is defined 
based on only the generation cost of its own 
power plants in GD regardless of the market price 
level. 
 
In this study, we simulate five levels of the constraints 
as listed in Table 1, respectively. 
3.3. Profit maximization 
Theoretically speaking, GD wants to sell generated 
electricity at a higher price, while RD wants to procure it 
at a lower price, which suggests a possibility of internal 
conflict. TD can resolve it to mediate between the two by 
aiming at overall profit maximization. Divisional and 
overall profits are calculated as follows: 
 Generation division 
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 Retail division 
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 Trading division 
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 Whole company 
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Then, the overall profit maximization model is 
formulated as  
yppGppEpp btyti
r
it
w
it
b
ti
s
it
w
it
s
tt )()()(PROmax   −+−+−= ∑∑  
s.t. Eqs. (1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8).  (13) 
 
In this model, unknown variables are sitE , ritG  and 
y
tp .  
3.4. Exogenous variables 
In Eq. (13), the fuel and power market prices ( w
tcoalp , ,
w
tgasp , , 
s
tp  and btp ) are exogenous variables, and in 
this study, we randomly generate the data for T points 
under the several conditions.  
 Fluctuation (2 cases) 
We assume two different conditions for the market 
price fluctuation for T periods, i.e. stable and volatile 
cases.  
Average gas and coal prices are defined referring to 
the actual market prices and converted into the unit of 
electric energy as ¥8.789/kWh and ¥3.264/kWh, 
respectively. Average of sell and buy prices in the power 
market are defined as ¥9.229/kWh, which is 5% higher 
than the average gas price. The market sell and buy 
prices are independently generated under the same 
condition.  
[Case 1] Stable: variance of coefficient is 0.05. 
[Case 2] Volatile case: variance of coefficient is 0.2. 
Table 1: Simulation of constraints on vertical integration 
(MO system) (VI system)
Free Constraint Strict
a 1 a 2 a 3 a 4 a 5
α = 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
b 1 b 2 b 3 b 4 b 5
β = 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
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 Trend (3 cases) 
We assume three conditions for the market price trend 
for T periods, i.e. increase, decrease and flat cases.  
[Case1] Up: increasing rate is +0.2% 
[Case2] Down: decreasing rate is -0.2% 
[Case3] Flat: increasing rate is 0%. 
 
As a result, we generate 6 (=2*3) price series for coal, 
gas and power prices, respectively, and then we have 216 
(=6*6*6) combinations. Figures 3a and 3b show 
generated data only for gas and coal price series. In 
addition, combinations of constraints (α, β) are 25 cases, 
resulting in 5,400 cases in total.  
For all of these cases, we solve Eq. (14), respectively, 
then obtain profit, stability, and competitiveness indices. 
It should be noted here that, to obtain the stability index, 
we need to calculate a standard deviation of profits, and 
therefore, repeated calculation is executed using 
randomly generated price series (for T periods) under the 
same condition for each case 2 . Then we obtain an 
average profit, a standard deviation of profits for the 
stability index, and an average retail price for the 
competitiveness index for 5,400 cases.  
However, in this paper, we fix the coal price series as 
(Volatile / Flat), because three indices are very similar 
even if we change the conditions of coal prices. Finally, 
we use 900 cases for DEA calculation. 
                                                          
2
 In this paper, we show the results of T=30.  
Furthermore, we postulate three types of fuel mix. 
Table 2 shows the capacity setting for the power plants 
in GD by type. Total retail demand ( y ) is also 
exogenous variable, which is defined as 10,000MW, in 
this study. The retail margin rate γ is defined as 5%, 
which is typical value in UK power companies. 
3.5. DEA Calculation 
As we mentioned, the profit, stability and 
competitiveness indices for each case may be differently 
evaluated, e.g. profit is large, while competitiveness is 
small. In order to obtain the comprehensive evaluation, 
we apply DEA.  
In this study, we use the SBM-max model (Tone, 
2015), which refers to the nearest point of the efficiency 
frontier in the slacks-based model. It can be said that the 
efficiency score is measured under the best condition for 
the target DMU.  
Profit is regarded as output, while stability (standard 
deviation of profits) and competitiveness (retail price 
level) are regarded as input, because they have better 
evaluation when they are small. DMUs are 900 cases for 
each fuel mix.  
   
 3a: Gas prices (6 cases) 3b: Coal Prices (6 cases) 
Figure 3: Market price setting (for 250 points)  
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Table 2: Fuel mix setting 
Gas Coal Hydro Total
Mix 1 8,000 2,000 2,000 12,000
Mix 2 2,000 8,000 2,000 12,000
Mix 3 2,000 2,000 8,000 12,000
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4. RESULTS 
4.1. Results of profit maximization 
Figures 4a-d plot the results of three indices obtained 
by Eq. (13) for all three fuel mix cases, and therefore, 
there are 2,700 (=900*3) dots on each figure. In addition, 
both inputs (stability and competitiveness indices) are 
divided by output (profit) in Figure 4d.  
As a fuel price of hydro power is defined as 0, all 
indices in the fuel mix 3 are better than those in the 
others, i.e. relatively larger profits, lower risks and lower 
retail prices, and vice versa for the fuel mix 1, because of 
strongly dependence on gas power plants. 
Figures 5a-d exhibit only for the fuel mix 1, in which 
GD owns large gas power plant capacity. 900 dots 
described in this figure are differently colored based on 
the level of constraints on vertical integration, a1 to a5 
and b1 to b5. Intuitively, we can find that the blue 
colored dots (b1) are relatively efficient.  
Figures 6a and 6b show the average of three indices in 
the case of fuel-mix1 by level of constraint. To adjust the 
level of three indices, every result is divided by total 
average throughout all constraints.  
According to these figures, profits is larger under less 
constraints, while risk is lower (more stable) under more 
strict constraints, especially, it is remarkable for the price 
constraints β. In addition, the volume constraints α have 
no influence on competitiveness, while strong price 
constraints β presents higher competitiveness (lower 
price level).  
As we assumed, evaluation of these three indices are 
different for each cases, and therefore, DEA method will 
help us to comprehensively evaluate them. 
     
 4a: input 1(Risk) v.s. output (Profit) 4b: input 2 (Retail price) v.s. output (Profit) 
     
 4c: input 1 (Risk) v.s. input 2(Retail price) 4d: input 1/output v.s. input 2/ output  
Figure 4: Scatter plot for one output (profit) and two inputs (risk and retail price) for all fuel mix cases 
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 5a: input 1(Risk) v.s. output (Profit) 5b: input 2 (Retail price) v.s. output (Profit) 
 
 5c: input 1 (Risk) v.s. input 2(Retail price) 5d: input 1/output v.s. input 2/ output  
Figure 5: Scatter plot for one output (profit) and two inputs (risk and retail price) for the case of fuel mix 1  
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 6a: average for each volume constraint 6b: average for each price constraint 
Figure 6: Average scores for each constraint for the case of fuel mix 1 
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4.2. Result of DEA 
Figures 7a-c describe average efficiency scores for 
each constraint level for each fuel mix. We can find 
relatively small difference among constraints in the case 
of fuel mix 3. It is attributable to the inexpensive 
generation cost in hydro power plants, and therefore, 
they can generate electricity regardless of the market 
situation. This implies that trading function will be more 
effectively workable in a company which own many 
fossil fueled power plants.  
In addition, it can be said that the free constraint case 
(a1 & b1), which is just the case of the pure MO system, 
is most efficient of all, and it becomes less efficient as 
the constraints become more strict. However, in the most 
  
7a: Fuel mix 1 (The capacity of gas power plant is large)  
 
 
7b: Fuel mix 2 (The capacity of coal power plant is large)  
 
 
7c: Fuel mix 3 (The capacity of hydro power plant is large)  
Figure 7: Average scores for each constraint 
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strict case (a5 & b5), which is the case of the pure VI 
system, the efficiency score can be better than that of the 
several other cases in the cases of fuel mix 1 and 2.  
Figures 8a and 8b focus on cases of volatile and stable 
in the power market price, in which scores are divided by 
the scores under no constraint case (a1 or b1) in order to 
compare the difference among constraints in all fuel 
mixes. In the volatile case, the MO system with less 
constraints performs better under every fuel mix. 
Therefore, if a company predicts power price in the 
market will volatile in the future, the MO system will be 
suitable for it, especially, for the company owning large 
gas power plants.  
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this study, we artificially generated price data for T 
periods, but they are finally averaged to only one value. 
Therefore, in the future work, we would like to calculate 
moving averages to evaluate the change of time series. 
Furthermore, we will examine several different settings 
to obtain more robust results.  
REFERENCES 
[1] Tone K, SBM variations revisited, GRIPS Discussion 
Paper 15-05 (2015).  
 
 8a: Volatile case  
 
 
 8b: Stable case  
Figure 8: Efficiency comparison among constrains 
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